JUDGES, BEHAVIORAL SCIENTISTS, AND
THE DEMANDS OF HUMANITY
ROBERT A. BURTt
When I clerked for David Bazelon in 1964-65, a large original
version of a Peanuts cartoon, inscribed by Charles M. Schulz, was
displayed on the wall in the Judge's inner chambers. In the first
frame of the cartoon, Lucy van Pelt discovers her comic book torn
and crumpled on the floor. In the second frame, with outrage
written on her face, she confronts her brother Linus with the corpus
delicti-and Lucy, you will recall, was never far from glowering
outrage. She shouts, "Who did this to my comic book? Are you
responsible for this?" Linus responds, "Am I responsible? That is
a very difficult question."
For the next several frames of the cartoon, Linus elaborates on
the difficulties. With his ever-present security blanket pressed
against his face and his customary dreamy expression, Linus
propounds a series of questions: "What is the meaning of responsibility? Is anyone truly responsible for his conduct? Is there such a
thing as free will or is each of us driven by forces beyond our
control?" Throughout this exposition, the outrage on Lucy's face
mounts in intensity. Finally she explodes: she rolls up her tattered
comic book and hits Linus on the head. In the final frame, Linusstunned and floored, his security blanket knocked from his graspsays sadly, "Her kind never understands."
There, we might say, was the trajectory of David Bazelon's
judicial career; in his more somber moments, the Judge himself said
something of the sort to me and to others. And there too is an
encapsulated social history of the United States from 1954, when
the Judge wrote the opinion in Durham v. United States,' to 1972,
when the Durham experiment was abandoned in United States v.
Brawner.2 In 1954 the Linuses of this country were speaking out,
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1 214 F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (holding that the defendant would not be
criminally responsible if the defendant's unlawful act was the product of mental
disease or defect).

2471 F.2d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (holding that a person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental
disease or defect, he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
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raising questions about the causes of social disorder-not only
regarding criminal conduct but more generally about the role of
racial, religious, ethnic, and economic conflicts in fomenting
disorder. The premise of these Linus-like questions around 1954
was that if we could understand the deepest roots of this divisiveness, we might then find means for healing; we might ease-we
might even transcend-many of these social conflicts. By 1972,
however, in the wake of political assassinations, race riots, and our
continued embroilment in the Vietnam War, American social
discord had almost drowned out the voices of our Linuses, and the
Lucy van Pelts-quick to anger, even quicker to punish, and
prepared to use books only as aggressive weapons and not as
instruments of understanding-had come into dominance.
In this essay, I want to identify some of the premises that guided
the Linus-like questions thatJudge Bazelon raised from the bench,
and the reasons in particular that he tried to enlist behavioral
scientists to join with him in this questioning. At the end of this
brief inquiry, I will conclude-and hope you are persuaded-that the
Judge's enterprise, his conception of his role as a judge, and the
correlative role he saw for the behavioral sciences are as appropriate
and important for 1994 as he believed they were in 1954.
In 1954 no one in American public life, whether on the bench
or elsewhere, was more insistent on raising these questions or more
intent on promoting processes of social healing than David Bazelon.
But he was not alone in that year. It is not at all coincidental that

in 1954, when Judge Bazelon wrote the Durham opinion, the
Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education.' The underlying ambition and premises of both decisions were the same. The
ambition was to transcend persistent, violent social conflict. The
premises were: first, that mutual understanding among the warring
parties was the key to achieving this ambition; second, that the
judiciary had an important role in promoting this mutual under-

standing; and third, that the judiciary could enlist the assistance of
behavioral scientists in this social healing enterprise.
Brown directly took on the problems of relations between Blacks
and Whites, the legacy of slavery, a bloody, destructive civil war that
ostensibly freed black people, and the succeeding segregation
regime that re-enslaved them. Durham was not directly aimed at
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law).
3 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that racial segregation in the public schools
denies black students equal protection).
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these problems: the defendant, Monte Durham, was a white man,
and he was not charged with a violent crime;4 but a perceived link
between crime and race relations was nonetheless the unspoken
subtext of Durham, as these two elements were inextricably
intertwined in popular understanding, especially in the District of
Columbia, which in 1954 had the highest proportion of non-Whites
in the population of any large American city.'
Durham was, of course, much more direct than Brown in
enlisting behavioral scientists for its social healing purposes. The
goal of Durham was to invite psychiatrists, in particular, to give
testimony based on their own scientific discipline's understanding
of human behavior, rather than through the presumed distortions
of nineteenth-century legal categories in the traditionally formulated
insanity defense. But behavioral science also played an important
role in Brown. Although it is easy to overlook this role forty years
afterward, the central legal problem in Brown was to identify the
grounds for overruling the holding in Plessy v. Ferguson that
"separate but equal" public facilities did not violate the equal
The
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.6
Supreme Court ruled to the contrary in Brown, finding that
"[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal."7 It came
to this legal conclusion, however, by denying that this was a
question of law. The dispositive step-indeed the only step-in the
Court's reasoning to support its finding of the inherent inequality
of school segregation was this one sentence: "Whatever may have
been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v.
Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority."'
The Court then appended a footnote to this sentence, citing seven
different contemporary studies by social scientists as the "modem
authority" that supported its disapproval of P"essy.
The Court was strenuously criticized for this invocation of
scientific authority to support its conclusion. For our evaluative
purposes today, we can ignore the segregationist complaints about
"pointy-headed left-wing intellectuals" setting the Court's entire
social agenda. We cannot, however, so quickly dismiss the criticism
4 See Durham, 214 F.2d at 864.
See BUREAU

OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF POPULATION:

1950, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
6 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896).
7Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
8
1Id. at 494.
9
Id. at 494-95 n.11.

POPULATION 1-139 to 1-140 (1953).
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from sympathetic observers that by relying on social scientists, the
Brown Court obscured the moral basis for their condemnation of
race segregation and appeared to treat the issue as technocraticthat is, properly resolved by experts alone-rather than democratic
at its core." There is considerable force in this criticism. But the
contemporaneous juxtaposition of Durham with Brown reveals a
common underlying assumption in the two cases about the
relationship between scientific expertise and moral judgment that
is responsive to this criticism, if not fully exculpatory.
In Durham and in succeeding cases addressing the role of
psychiatric testimony in insanity defense cases, Judge Bazelon was
much more explicit and revealing regarding the relationship of
scientific and moral judgment than the Supreme Court's compressed, cryptic citation in Brown." As the Judge saw it, properly
formulated psychiatric testimony should give an account of the
criminal defendant's psychological dynamic: what forces, one might
say, arising from his "nature" (that is, his genetic endowments) and
from his "nurture" (that is, his experiences in his family and cultural
2
environments) might help to explain the origins of his behavior.'
This psychiatric testimony about the defendant was, according to
Judge Bazelon, quite distinct from any moral judgment."3 Thejury
alone was entitled to reach a moral judgment; it, and it alone, would
decide whether the defendant's conduct was morally blamewor14

thy.

Judge Bazelon never succeeded in enforcing this distinction in
the insanity defense cases that appeared in his court from 1954
when Durham was decided until 1972 when Durham was abandoned.
This was a source of enormous frustration to the Judge-the basic
reason he finally declared the Durham experiment a "failure" and

"0See generally Symposium, The Courts, Social Science, and School Desegregation,39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 1975, at 1 (examining the effect on

education of Brown and subsequent efforts at desegregation from the viewpoint of
both legal scholars and social scientists).
11

See DAVID L. BAZELON, QUESTIONING AUTHORrrY: JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL LAW

49-70 (1988) (explaining the decision of the D.C. Circuit in Durham and analyzing its
shortcomings).
12 See id. at 60-61.
's See id. at 49.
14See id. at 54. In reaching this judgment, the jury would use the psychiatric
testimony about the psychodynamic origins of the defendant's conduct; but this
testimony was meant to offer, in effect, only the raw material on which a moral
judgment would be based, and not to provide a moral judgment in itself. See id.
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one of the reasons, I believe, that he felt such a kinship with Linus,
sitting stunned from his sister's blow and unhappy at her unwillingness or inability to understand. As the Judge saw it-quite justifiably, I believe-no matter how hard he tried, psychiatric witnesses
still acted like Lucy van Pelt, inattentive to the complexities of
human conduct and quick to reach punitive moral judgments,
embedding these moralistic conclusions in psychiatric jargon about
whether the defendant was "psychopathic" (thus "mentally ill and
morally blameless") or "sociopathic" (and thus more "evil" than
"ill"). (For those who are aficionados of Charles Schulz's work, you
will remember that Lucy also served as the resident psychiatrist for
the Peanuts gang; she would sit behind a kind of adapted curbstone
lemonade stand, under a sign announcing that "the psychiatrist is
in," and, in response to the accounts of human pain and error that
Charlie Brown and the other patients would bring to her, she would
dispense dismissive moralistic homilies.)
Lucy van Pelt, as well as the other psychiatrists who were "in,"
deserved Judge Bazelon's relentless criticism. A tension always
existed, however, in the Judge's criticism of psychiatrists in insanity
defense cases for their failure to distinguish between scientific and
moral judgments. The tension arose not only because of the
intrinsic difficulty of drawing this distinction, but because, I believe,
the Judge himself considered the basic tenets of behavioral science
not only consistent with but supportive of his deepest moral beliefs.
In this sense, the Judge himself did not distinguish between
scientific and moral judgments. Judge Bazelon was, moreover, not
alone in this position; the Justices in Brown v. Board of Education
invoked social science to condemn race segregation based on this
same conviction that moral purpose and the science of human
behavior were mutually reinforcing.
This conviction is based on the proposition that a scientific
understanding of human conduct necessarily and naturalistically
begins with the proposition that all human beings are fundamentally
alike. In my view, this is a logically correct proposition. The human
sciences posit that-notwithstanding the often vast differences in our
endowments and capacities, in our personalities and conduct-each
of us can properly be understood as members of the same human
species whose essential nature develops according to the same
natural rules.
Two different kinds of moral implications arise from this basic
proposition. The first implication is that we can reach moral
judgments about one another only if we begin with the descriptive
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scientific premise that we are fundamentally alike as a species. In
other words, unless we can understand one another in the same
terms, as members of the same species, we are simply mysterious
and inaccessible to one another and have no basis for making
comparative evaluative judgments of any sort. This implication does
not, however, mean that because all human beings are fundamentally alike they are obliged, or even inclined, to like one another or
approve of one another, or even treat one another with kindness
rather than hostility. A naturalistic scientific understanding of
human nature could start from the premise of fundamental
similarity and yet come to the conclusion, for example, that each of
us is fundamentally alike in being by nature avaricious and selfseeking and thus a constant threat to all others.
This was Thomas Hobbes's social scientific understanding of
human nature. 5 But Hobbes himself, the great progenitor of
modern social science, drew a further implication from this
understanding. He concluded that if human beings rationally
understood and clearly acknowledged their naturally shared
fundamental characteristic, they would draw the same normative
conclusion; that is, they would construct a social organization to
govern themselves in a way that would effectively curb their mutual
hostility.'
Hobbes further argued that one normative conclusion
in particular would follow from this scientific understanding-that
mankind would understand that it could end its self-destructive
warfare only by creating a sovereign to rule over everyone and be
accountable to no one. 7 This particular solution had little to
commend itself for David Bazelon; he, as well as the Justices in
Brown, however, did follow out the same logical pathway that
Hobbes had marked four centuries earlier. Bazelon and the Justices
in Brown believed that if human beings focused clearly and
rationally on the descriptive scientific proposition that we are all
fundamentally alike in our nature, then we would be more inclined

15See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1651). Hobbes
stated:
[B]ecause the condition of Man ... is a condition of Warre of every one
against every one; in which case every one is governed by his own Reason;
and there is nothing he can make use of, that may not be a help unto him,
in preserving his life against his enemyes; It followeth, that in such a
condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body.

Id. at 107.

16See id. at 107-08.

17 See id. at 143.
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to view one another with sympathy, with mutual understanding, and
fellow feeling.
In the simplified, schematic way that I have sketched it, this
position may seem naive and sentimental. In retrospect, viewed
from the hardened social perspective of 1994, many of the common
social beliefs generally held by Americans in 1954 may indeed
appear so. In 1954 this country had just passed through two quite
terrible and terrifying conflicts-the Great Depression and then the
Second World War-and emerged socially more unified and
economically stronger than even the wildest optimist would have
predicted in the darkest days, say, of 1932. Against the backdrop of
this harmonious ethos, there was no social conflict in the United
States of 1954 that seemed inherently intractable-whether it was
our historic racial divisions or the even more universal and longstanding struggles between rich and poor. So there may have been
some naivet6, some excessive optimism, in the American zeitgeist of
1954, that led the Justices in Brown to demand that the country
confront its racial conflicts, or that led Judge Bazelon in Durham to
insist that the community, through its criminal juries, face the truth
that criminal offenders were not a different breed of humanity but
were products of the psychological and social forces that shape us
all.
If there was some naivet6 here, however, there was nonetheless
a greater measure of hardheaded realism in these judicial demands.
In terms of believing in the possibility of harmonious social
relations in this country, 1954 may have been one of a few high
points in American history. But no one who had lived during the
first half of the twentieth century-least of all David Bazelon, as I
knew him-could be unaware of the potential for hatred and
brutality in all human affairs. The Nazi Holocaust alone proved this
point. The Holocaust also demonstrated the ease with which
science can be enlisted in destructive social enterprises-not only,
and not even principally, in the design of weapons of terrible force,
but more insidiously in the justification on supposedly scientific
grounds of the subordination and ultimate annihilation of some
people by other people.
The central question for Judge Bazelon's generation-the
question that remains as urgent for us today-is whether the depths
of human brutality revealed by the Holocaust can be averted in
social relations. Judge Bazelon's answer was that judges in particular have a unique preventative role to continuously warn us of our
propensity toward mutually destructive cruelties, and that one way
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for judges to accomplish this role is to enlist behavioral scientists in
emphasizing the proposition that all human beings are fundamentally alike. Judge Bazelon's answer also remains relevant to our time.
Many people today deny this relevance. These deniers, however,
fail to understand that neither judges nor behavioral scientists can
be, so to speak, "neutral" in this matter. These deniers do not
realize that unless judges actively oppose the impulse toward
oppressive brutality in social relations, they will inevitably find
themselves enlisted as active agents of that brutality. The equivalent
belief in scientific "neutrality" is similarly blind to the reality that
behavioral scientists have only this same stark choice: as scientists,
they can work either to avert or to promote this brutality, but they
cannot exempt themselves from participating in one effort or the
other.
The nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century history in this
country of our treatment of mentally disabled people illustrates the
truth of this proposition, both as it applied to behavioral scientists
and to judges. In the early nineteenth century, when specialized
social institutions were created for mentally disabled people, there
were two different goals visibly at work: an individually focused
recuperative or restorative purpose, to provide distinctive treatment
in a sheltered environment for disabled people; and a socially
focused purpose of protecting the "normal" world against the
disruptive threats presented or imagined from "abnormal" people."8 These two goals always coexisted in the scientific and social
rhetoric and practice that surrounded the specialized institutions for
mentally ill and mentally retarded people.
Yet increasingly
throughout the nineteenth century, in both the social understanding
and practical workings of these institutions, one of these two goals
was emphasized-the social protective goal-ultimately to the virtual
exclusion of the other, individual restorative goal.19
The result, in practical terms, was the confinement of an ever
increasing number of people in ever larger-scale institutions. These
people were, moreover, disproportionately drawn from vulnerable
minority populations-recent immigrants and members of racial and
ethnic minorities who were viewed with fear and aversion by the
majority of "normal" Americans. Furthermore, the conditions in
these institutions descended into such hellishly brutal conditions
'8 See DAVID MECHANIC, MENTAL HEALTH AND SoCIAL PoucY 51-55 (1969).
19See id. at 53-54 (detailing the custodial purposes that guided treatment in a
nineteenth-century mental hospital).
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that it seemed impossible to imagine that the institutions existed for
any purpose except the infliction of torture for its own sake.
Nevertheless, the behavioral scientists of the day continued20 to offer
scientific rationales for the workings of these institutions.
Some of this rhetoric was almost patently fraudulent, insofar as
claims were made that individual inmates were therapeutically
helped by these inflictions; but this kind of fraud was not the most
insidious problem. The fundamental damage was done by scientists
who justified the existence of these institutions based on claims that
their inmates were intrinsically different from other, normal human
beings. These claims were not clearly fraudulent. Differences could
be observed between many mentally ill or retarded people and
others; it was plausible in many cases to conclude that these
differences were irrevocable and incurable. The proper question
for the behavioral scientists was not whether these differences
existed, but whether they should be underscored or instead whether
the points of commonality or even potential commonality should be
emphasized.
From a strictly scientific perspective, there was no clearly correct
answer to this question. Although there are many commonalities
between mentally "normal" and "abnormal" people, these commonalities are not necessarily more fundamental than the categorical
differences that can be objectively observed and described. At the
same time, neither is the existence of the differences the scientifically more fundamental characteristic. A scientist can choose one
or the other emphasis; but-and here is the crucial point-the
scientist must make one choice or the other, must emphasize
commonality and correspondingly incline toward disregarding
differences or vice versa.
Let me use a prosaic example to illustrate this proposition.
Consider the old saw of the glass that is either half empty or half
full. Viewed from some Olympian perspective, the truth is that this
water glass is both half full and half empty. To add another such

20

See GERALD N. GROB, THE STATE AND THE MENTALLY ILL:

A

HISTORY OF

WORCESTER STATE HOSPITAL IN MASSACHUSETTS, 1830-1920, at 10 (1966) (explaining

that the approach known as "moral treatment" involved the creation of a total social,
physical, and psychological therapeutic environment); MECHANIC, supra note 18, at
51-56 (basing moral treatment on the assumption that psychiatric illness could be
alleviated if the patient was treated in a consisteht and friendly fashion); DAVID J.
ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM:

SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE

NEW REPUBLIC 109-29 (1971) (explaining the treatment of patients in these
institutions as a vigorous attempt to promote the stability of the society).
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example, a pen-and-ink drawing that sometimes looks like a duck
and sometimes looks like a rabbit is neither a duck nor a rabbit, but
is truly a duck-rabbit. But our perceptual, cognitive capacity does
not permit us to see both elements at the same time: if we see the
glass as half full, we can see it half empty only by reorienting our
perspective; if we see the duck, we cannot see the rabbit until we

stop seeing the duck.
These perceptual examples have direct application in social
perceptions. We may describe mixed emotions toward mentally ill
or disabled people in the same breath-as ambivalence, both fear
and pity, empathic identification and differentiated aversion. As a
matter of general social perception, however, it is impossible, I
believe, to truly feel both sides of this ambivalence at once; either
side, if dwelled upon, tends to magnify itself and render the

opposed perception increasingly out of reach, conceptually
implausible, and impossible to imagine.
We can see exactly this social perceptual process at work in the
response of judges in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries to claims regarding mentally ill or retarded people. By
accepting and themselves underscoring a starkly differentiated social
conception of disabled people, American judges fed the escalating
social impulse toward brutalization. The high point of this judicial
confirmation came in a 1927 Supreme Court opinion by Oliver
Wendell Holmes, upholding compulsory sterilization of people with
supposed genetically transmitted "feeble-mindedness." 21 In a nownotorious passage, Holmes justified this scientific policy in these
terms:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it
could not call upon those who already sap the strength of the State
for these lesser sacrifices ....
It is better for all the world, if
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to
let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who
22
are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.
The embattled rhetoric of this passage is not incidental. Holmes
portrays the struggle between the mentally normal and abnormal as
a virtual war: we normal people must fight to ensure that we are
not "swamped with incompetence." 2 This imagery reflects the
21Buck
2Id.
23

Id.

v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927).

at 207.
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pervasive impact of the Civil War experience on Holmes and his
contemporaries;2 4 from it, they thought they learned that all social

relations are based on ceaseless hostility. This dark premise was the
dominant guide for judicial conduct by the end of the nineteenth
century at least until the Second World War-not only in judicial
participation in institutional commitments for mentally disabled
25
people and in approving sterilization laws, but more generally.
The starkest examples can be seen in judicial review of general
social regulation, especially in the Lochner line of decisions, in which
the judges viewed labor-protective legislation as nothing more than
class warfare that victimized employers,26 and in race matters
epitomized by Plessy, in which judges approved the subordination of
Blacks on the ground that equality was a chimerical goal in race
relations, that because race warfare was inevitable, one race must
always dominate the other. 27 In all of these social relations, from
the late nineteenth century well into the mid-twentieth century, we
can see how the premise of fundamental hostility and the judicial
endorsement of that premise led not simply to drawing sharp lines
of differentiation-battle lines, in effect-between the contending
parties (between Blacks and Whites, between labor and capital, and
between mentally normal and abnormal people). We can also see
the escalating brutalization of the vulnerable people on the
disfavored side of those battle lines as evidenced by the lynchings
and race riots, the spread of labor relations violence, and the
horrendous "snake-pit" confinements of increasing numbers of

mentally disabled people.
The linkage that I have identified between Durham and Brown in
1954 was thus not the first time in our history when a close
connection could be seen in judicial attitudes toward racial

24

See generally MARK D. HOWE,JUsTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING

YEARS, 1841-1870 (1957) (concluding that Holmes's Civil War experience dominated

his later years). See also Saul Touster, In Search of Holmes from Within, 18 VAND. L.
REV. 437, 437 (1965) (describing the "development of the Olympian aloofness,
sentiment of honor, and disbelief in causes that characterized Holmes's later life").
5
2 See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLiCT 237-53 (1992). The
Court was prompted by the Civil War experience in its fear of organized labor's
disruptive
power and its determination to protect employer property. See id.
26
See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561-62 (1923) (invalidating
a minimum-wage law for women under the theory of freedom of contract); Coppage
v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (holding that anti-"yellow dog" statutes violate due
process by impairing the freedom of contract); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64
(1905)
(upholding the freedom of contract in the labor market).
27
1 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
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minorities and mentally disabled people. The only difference
between 1954 and this earlier history is that in 1954Judge Bazelon
in Durham and the Justices in Brown chose to emphasize the
possibility of harmonious relations rather than accentuate the
prospect of endless hostilities. Judge Bazelon and the BrownJustices
enlisted behavioral science for this social healing purpose rather
than, as earlier judges had done, relying on behavioral scientists to
patrol the ramparts by emphasizing differences between "normal"
and "abnormal" human beings as battle lines between hostile
combatants.
The Nazi experience in Germany brings all of this into even
clearer focus. American attitudes toward racial conflict and the
subordination of Blacks were explicitly invoked by German
behavioral scientists to justify their own segregation and miscegenation laws directed against Jews.28 American sterilization practices
in general, and Justice Holmes's constitutional approbation in
particular, were explicitly cited by German physicians to justify, first,
their mass sterilizations of mentally disabled people, and second,
euthanasia-their purposeful killing of "useless eaters" who sapped
the strength of the Reich-which in turn led, in a direct line, to the
killing camps at Auschwitz.2" It is fashionable today to claim that
the Nazi doctors and behavioral scientists were practicing "fraudulent science." But this is a glib and ultimately misleading account."0 The racialist scientific efforts to identify differences in
"8See RobertN. Proctor,NaziDoctors,RacialMedicine,andHuman Experimentation,
in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE:

HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN

EXPERIMENTATION 17,23 (GeorgeJ. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992). Proctor
notes that

Nazi physicians on more than one occasion argued that German racial
policies were relatively "liberal" compared with the treatment of blacks in
the United States .... Nazi physicians spent a great deal of time discussing
American miscegenation legislation; German medicaljournals reproduced
charts showing the states in which blacks could or could not marry whites,
could or could not vote, and so forth.... [Moreover, in] 1939, Germany's
leading racial hygiene journal reported the refusal of the American Medical
Association to admit black physicians to its membership; 5,000 black
physicians had petitioned to join the all-white American body but were
turned down. German physicians only one year before, in 1938, had barred
Jews from practicing medicine (except on otherJews); Nazi racial theorists
were thereby able to argue that Germany was "not alone" in its efforts to
preserve racial purity.
Id. (footnote omitted).
See id. at 21-25.
?
SOSee Mario Biagioli, Science Modernity and the "FinalSolution,
in PROBING THE
LIMITS OF REPRESENTATION: NAZISM AND THE "FINAL SOLUTION" 185, 185 (Saul
2
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intelligence or skull dimensions or nose shapes may have been fools'
errands, and may even have been bolstered by falsified data. But
there surely are observable genetic differences among racial groups
(such as the concentration of the gene for Tay-Sachs disease among
Eastern European Jews, or for sickle cell anemia among Blacks).
The question is not whether these scientific differentiations are
fraudulent; it is whether we choose to make them relevant for any
social purpose, whether these differences should be emphasized or
submerged by accentuating human commonalities more than
st
differences.
American society today has virtually abandoned the fundamental
principle enunciated forty years ago by Judge Bazelon in Durham
and the Supreme Court in Brown. Today, the dominant voices in
our judicial, as well as our political, institutions emphasize human
differences more than commonalities; and this divisive behavior is
based on the premise that social hostility is widespread and
incorrigible, that harmonious social relations among differing
groups cannot reliably be achieved. A radical change in attitude
toward the criminal justice system is among the most striking
indicators of this stark difference between the social ethos of 1954
and 1994. Today there is virtually no one on the ideological
spectrum from left to right who maintains, as Judge Bazelon
insisted, that the goal of rehabilitating criminal offenders is a
critically important systemic ideal. Judge Bazelon was intensely
critical of our shortcomings in implementing this ideal and of the
hypocrisy and brutality practiced in the supposed service of this
ideal; but despite these shortcomings, neither he nor those whose
voices were dominant in legal institutions in the 1950s was prepared
to abandon the pursuit of this ideal.
In sharp contrast, the rehabilitative ideal has been virtually
abandoned today as a goal of the criminal justice system. s2 Since
1970 our federal and state prison population has more than tripled;
we have the highest rate of incarceration in the entire world and the
length of our prison terms, as well as the numbers of prisoners, is
increasing at a higher rate than in any other country in the
world.33 The significance of these statistics is indicated by our
Friedlander ed., 1992).
s For a sensitive, extended exploration of this proposition, see MARTHA MINOW,
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990).
S2 See generally Robert A. Burt, Cruelty, Hypocrisy, and the Rehabilitative Ideal in

Corrections, 16 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 359 (1993).
33 See NORvAL MORRIS & MICHAEL H. TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION:
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current romantic obsession with the death penalty: the premise that
criminal offenders are not simply different from law-abiding
citizens, but that they are so different as to stand altogether outside
the bounds of humanity. The justification typically offered for this
judgment is that the criminal offenders themselves have treated
their victims as less than human, as expendable. This may be true,
and the impulse toward retaliatory inflictions may accordingly be
intensely felt. But if "they"-the criminal element-treat "us" as
expendable and we in turn treat them as less than human, it is hard
to see how this cycle of inhumane infliction is ever interrupted. All
of the evidence I can see indicates that in these retaliatory inflictions, everyone-both the good guys and the bad guys-becomes
34
trapped in an escalating contest of brutalizing inhumanity.
Those who argue for the use of the death penalty or for longer
prison terms can point to real, observable differences between
criminal offenders and peaceable people. Among these advocates
are behavioral scientists who will testify to the ineradicability of
these differences and judges who, based on this testimony, are
prepared to expel offenders from membership in the human race.
I disagree with these scientists and judges. The choice in these
matters, however, is not between truth and falsehood in behavioral
science; nor is it between a true and false interpretation of ajudge's
constitutional role. Scientists can justify accentuating the differences among people as well as emphasizing human commonalities. Our
constitutional tradition, both in its origins and in its successive
interpretations, provides precedent for judicial conduct that
approves policies of differentiation and subordination as expressions of social hostility, as well as judicial conduct that gives clear
preference to equality, that is, to essentially undifferentiated status
based on a vision of shared humanity. Neither of these positions is
provably false, but one of them is ultimately and terrifyingly
dangerous.
Judge Bazelon saw the dangers that arise when judges and
scientists, acting together or alone, endorse differentiation and
subordination of one human being by another. He also saw that a
contrary conception of the judicial role or of the uses of science
offers no guarantee of social harmony. Yet he understood that

INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 47 (1990); DavidJ.
Rothman, The Crime of Punishment, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 17, 1994, at 34, 34.
34 See Robert A. Burt, Democracy, Equality,and the DeathPenalty, THE RULE OF LAW:
NOMOS XXXVI, at 80, 90-97 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994).
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unless judges and scientists alike emphasize our human commonalities-unless they emphasize the underlying social and psychological
forces that can promise to draw us together-then we will be fated
to drive one another further and further apart.
The apostles of organized social violence-of the death penalty,
and of merely custodial confinement of "abnormal" people in
prisons or mental institutions-offer a prospect of social harmony in
the guise of victory by the forces of good over the forces of evil, of
the "peace forces" over the "criminal forces." The only peace that
can ever come by this route, however, is the leveled exhaustion of
the bloodied battlefield, the silence of the graveyard, the ashes of
the crematorium. This is the state that follows from the battle cries
of the Lucy van Pelts of this world. In these battles, the Linuses
among us sometimes are knocked to the sidelines. But, as David
Bazelon's career attests, the hardiest souls get up again, to raise
their disturbing questions and to warn us of the consequences of
refusing to search for understanding. Judge Bazelon understood
that if you are not part of this solution, then you-as a judge, as a
behavioral scientist, and as a citizen-are part of the problem. Of
this we can be sure: David Bazelon was not part of the problem.
We should return to his mission.

FROM THE EDITORS
Professor Susan Sturm commented on Professor Robert Burt's
Article at the Bazelon Conference. After reviewing Professor
Sturm's written version of her remarks, Professor Burt sent her a
letter, dated September 8, 1994. Rather than responding in a letter,
Professor Sturm revised her commentary to take the letter into
account. The professors agreed that publishing the original version
of Professor Sturm's commentary was unnecessary. To assist the
reader, the Editors have added citations to Professor Burt's letter.

